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INTRODUCTION 
 
The presence of nuclear weapons in the Arctic, on or under 
the sea, in the air, or in land-based missiles is a threat to global 
stability that could be eliminated. The two greatest security 
threats of the 21
st
 century are nuclear weapons and climate 
change. Arctic ice is experiencing a climate-change-induced 
meltdown, which is bringing about great upheavals in the 
                                                          
1 *M.Sc.(Physics, University of Alberta), Ph.D. (Aerospace Engineering, 
University of Toronto), D.Sc. (Hon., University of Toronto). Physicist, 
engineer and environmental scientist. Past Chair of the Canadian national group 
of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, currently 
Treasurer, Executive Committee; member international Pugwash Council. 
Formerly V.P. Technology and Research, Ontario Centre for Environmental 
Technology Advancement; formerly V.P. Solarchem Environmental Systems; 
founding partner of Sciex, later a division of MDS Inc.  
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commercial exploitation of Arctic resources, the international 
governance of the Arctic, ecosystems and the indigenous way of 
life. Climate change in the Arctic affects the entire global 
weather system, and weather extremes are already being felt 
world wide – a harbinger of broader climate change to come. 
Although the current risk of Arctic conflict is low, the global 
instability caused by climate change will increase tensions. 
Military threats and action may occur anywhere in the global 
community, and could be initiated from Arctic bases. At present, 
the circumpolar nations,
2
 and others, are putting in place many 
national, bi-national, and multilateral agreements, with the intent 
of supporting an orderly opening of the previously inaccessible 
Arctic. Circumpolar nations are striving for a cooperative 
security environment, in a non-militarized Arctic. Now is the 
right time to put in place the foundations of a future nuclear-
weapon-free Arctic.  
I. THE EVOLVING ARCTIC 
There will be navigation routes open for use in summer seas; 
estimates for an ice-free Arctic in the summer months place it as 
early as 2020 and as late as 2050.
3
 A few commercial shipments 
are already occurring. The Northeast Passage, offshore of 
Russia, is quite active; Russian icebreakers guided ships through 
(at a cost).
4
 The Northwest Passage, off Canadian shores, will 
take longer to warm, but is already a subject of tourist voyages 
                                                          
2 Nuclear Weapons States [hereinafter NWS] – United States, Russia; 
Non-Nuclear Weapons States [hereinafter NNWS] – Canada, Denmark 
(Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. 
3 ROB HUEBERT ET AL., CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS 
CLIMATE CHANGE & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THE ARCTIC AS A BELLWETHER 
12 (2012), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/arctic-security-
report.pdf; Muyin Wang & James E. Overland, A sea ice free summer Arctic 
within 30 years?, 36 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Apr. 2009, at 2-3. 
4 Trude Petterson, 46 Vessels through Northern Sea Route, BARENTS 
OBSERVER.COM (Nov. 23, 2012), http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/ 
2012/11/46-vessels-through-northern-sea-route-23-11. 
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and a few commercial trips.
5
 Further, as the Chinese 
demonstrated in summer 2012, a passage of an icebreaker vessel, 
straight across the ice, outside any territorial waters of the Arctic 
Ocean is already possible.
6
 This interesting development takes 
place in the presence of massive deficiencies in infrastructure, 
significant need for new regulations, unprepared ships, and 
virtually no crew with experience in Arctic conditions.  
The Arctic as a new frontier for resource exploration and 
development is being well publicized in a world where easily 
accessible sources of oil and gas continue to be depleted. This 
will be a major issue within the Arctic Council. The Chair of the 
Arctic Council
7
 was assumed by Canada at the 2013 Meeting, 
and will pass to the United States in 2015. Operating in Arctic 
waters is technically difficult, and very risky, as amply 
demonstrated by the experience of Shell with its drilling 
platform (a ship) in the Chukchi Sea. Despite the relatively easy 
exploratory site, in Arctic geography, the drilling ship broke free 
and had to be abandoned.
8
 Pressure to indefinitely delay drilling
9
 
                                                          
5 Michael Byers, International Law and the Arctic, Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, 8-5, 269; Nordic Orion out of the Northwest Passage, MAR. 
DENMARK (Sept. 24, 2013 8:00 AM), http://www.maritimedenmark.dk 
/?Id=17208. The Danish-owned freight ship Nordic Orion travelled the 
Northwest Passage on its voyage from Vancouver to Finland. Id. 
6 Xue Long Entered the Sea-Ice Zone of the Arctic Ocean, 
CHINARE5.COM, http://www.chinare5.com/news/33-xue-long-entered-the-sea-
ice-zone-of-the-arctic-ocean (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
7 Arctic Council Leadership Transition at Eighth Ministerial Meeting 
reported that the Chair of the Arctic Council was assumed in May 2013 by The 
Honourable Leona Aglukkaq, Minister of Health, Minister of the Canadian 
Northern Economic Development Agency and Minister for the Arctic Council, 
http://www.arcus.org/witness-the-arctic/2013/2/article/19974 (last visited Sept. 
7, 2013). 
8 Jim Efstathiou Jr., Rig Grounding Revives Debate Over Shell’s Arctic 
Drilling, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 3, 2013, 8:09PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/rig-grounding-revives-debate-
over-shell-s-arctic-drilling.html. 
9 Frances Beinecke, Six Reasons Why Offshore Drilling in the Arctic 
Cannot Be Done Safely, NRDC SWITCHBOARD, June 10, 2013, 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/fbeinecke/six_reasons_why_offshore_drill.ht
ml; See also - Bob Weber, Arctic aboriginals call for end to offshore drilling, 
pause in northern energy projects, GLOBE & MAIL (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/arctic-aboriginals-call-for-end-
to-offshoredrilling-pause-in-northern-energy-projects/article11901715/. 
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for hydrocarbons in Arctic waters is growing; there is opposing 
pressure in favor of exploratory drilling, and governments, as in 
Canada
10
 and Norway,
11
 are issuing permits. At the Arctic 
Council Ministerial meeting in May 2013, Arctic Ministers 
signed the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.
12
 These arrangements 
reduce risk, but are unable to provide sufficient protection in the 
severe Arctic environment.  
Many fishing fleets are eyeing the Arctic Ocean as a new 
source of supply, even though data on fish stocks is virtually 
non-existent. Regulatory control is weak; an international 
agreement on fisheries protection beyond the 200 mile limit 
would assist with sustainable use, but means of enforcement 
would also be necessary.
13
 
Permafrost is melting, both undersea and on land.
14
 Since 
permafrost contains vast stores of methane and/or methyl 
hydrates [which convert to methane], release of this stored potent 
                                                          
10 Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Agreement on Cooperation 
on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, May 15, 
2013, explaining that document was signed at the Arctic Council Ministerial 
meeting in May 2013 and that Minister Aglukkaq stated Canada would 
continue to work on oil-spill prevention during its chairmanship; Federal-
Provincial Cooperation Modernizing Liability for Offshore Petroleum Drilling 
Operators, NAT. RESOURCES CAN. (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media/photo-public-eng.php?start=20 (last visited Oct. 
29, 2013) (Stating “[t]he Honourable Joe Oliver, Canada's Minister of Natural 
Resources, with the Honourable Darrell Dexter, Premier of Nova Scotia, 
announced plans to support jobs and enhance our world-class offshore 
petroleum drilling regime by raising the absolute liability for companies 
operating in the Atlantic offshore to $1 billion from $30 million. Minister 
Oliver also announced that offshore absolute liability would be increased from 
$40 million to $1 billion in the Arctic.”). 
11 Gwladys Fouche, UPDATE 2-Norway awards Arctic oil licences in 
northwards push, REUTERS (June 12, 2013, 8:28 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/12/norway-oillicensing-
idUSL5N0EO1MU20130612. 
12 Press Release, Office of the Spokesperson, Agreement on Cooperation 
on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (May 15, 
2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209406.htm. 
13 Byers, supra note 5, at 178.  
14 Martin O. Jeffries, James E. Overland, & Donald K. Perovich, The 
Arctic Shifts to a New Normal, 66 PHYSICS TODAY 35, 36 (Oct., 2013), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/PT.3.2147.  
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greenhouse gas would be a major driver of further global 
warming,
15
 which in itself poses a serious security threat.
16
 
Permafrost also poses a threat to Arctic infrastructure.
17
 Building 
foundations, pipelines, existing or potential highways can all 
suffer major collapse from instability of underlying permafrost.  
Because ocean levels are rising, and Arctic storms are 
anticipated to be more violent, coastal regions will experience 
severe seasonal flooding.
18
 Thus some coastal communities will 
no longer be viable and the inhabitants will have to leave 
permanently. Inland, the glaciers, lakes and rivers are no longer 
ecologically stable.
19
 Permanent changes to the land and sea are 
occurring,
20
 and so the northern aboriginal community and its 
wildlife must adapt to change in habitat, nature of species, and 
food supply webs on which all depend.   
Without intervention, human insecurity will increase, so a 
massive adaptation will be necessary. At issue are food, water, 
housing and health. Arctic peoples, aboriginal and other, have 
repeatedly stated that they have a right to participate in decisions 
that affect their lives.
21
 Overall, it is anticipated that they will be 
present at national, bi-national and multilateral negotiations,
22
 
                                                          
15 Id. at 38. 
16 HUEBERT ET AL., supra note 3, at 1, 5. 
17 Jeffries, supra note 14, at 39. 
18 SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC 79 (2004). 
19 John P. Smol & Marianne S. V. Douglas, Crossing the Final 
Ecological Threshold in High Arctic Ponds, 104 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCI. OF THE U.S. 12395, 12395 (2007), available at http://www.pnas.org/ 
content/104/30/12395.full.pdf+html. 
20 ROSENBERG INT’L FORUM, THE MACKENZIE RIVER BASIN: REPORT OF 
THE ROSENBERG INTERNATIONAL FORUM’S WORKSHOP ON TRANSBOUNDARY 
RELATIONS IN THE MACKENZIE RIVER BASIN 22 (2013), available at 
http://thetyee.ca/Documents/2013/06/10/Rosenberg-Report.pdf. 
21 INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR CONF., PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS FOR A 
COMPREHENSIVE ARCTIC POLICY 13 (1992). 
22 Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic 
Council, (Sept. 19, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 1387, 1388 [hereinafter Ottawa 
Declaration] (“Recognizing the traditional knowledge of the indigenous people 
of the Arctic and their communities and taking note of its importance….”); See 
generally, ARCTIC COUNCIL, DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH: 
THE ARCTIC COUNCIL PROGRAM DURING CANADA’S CHAIRMANSHIP 2013-2015 
(2013), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-
archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting? 
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but the degree of aboriginal influence has yet to be 
demonstrated.   
A.  Military Presence in the Arctic 
 
“Circumpolar Military Facilities of the Arctic Five”23 has 
extensive lists of such facilities for Canada, United States, 
Russia, Norway and Denmark. All circumpolar states are 
increasing their military capacity in the Arctic.
24
 While this 
could signal a combative stance, all participants state that they 
intend a cooperative mode of operation, and their presence is 
established for the purpose of maintaining sovereignty and 
stability.
25
 Military and coast guard equipment and trained 
personnel have the greatest ability to conduct search and rescue 
operations, assist with environmental emergencies, and assure 
compliance with regulations.   
Arctic states, noting that there is no military threat in the 
region, in their self-interest, are committed to cooperation and 
peace in the Arctic. A May 2011 DOD report to the U.S. 
Congress is cited in a report from the Congressional Research 
Service “Changes in the Arctic: Background Issues for 
Congress:”26  
 
Strategic guidance on the Arctic is articulated in 
National Security Presidential Directive (NPSD) 
66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 
25, Arctic Region Policy. Additional guidance is 
found in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 
                                                                                                                   
download=1763:canadian-chairmanship-program-2013-2015-english 
(describing the objectives of the Arctic Council).  
23 ERNIE REGEHR, THE SIMONS FOUNDATION, CIRCUMPOLAR MILITARY 
FACILITIES OF THE ARCTIC FIVE (2013), available at 
http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/all/files/Circumpolar%20Military%20 
Facilities%20-%20updated%2021%20August%202013.pdf. 
24 FRANKLIN GRIFFITHS ET AL., CANADA AND THE CHANGING ARCTIC: 
SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP 50 (2011). 
25 Id. at 38; Gerard O’Dwyer, Arctic Nations Set Cooperation Guidelines, 
DEFENSENEWS (Jun. 27, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.defensenews.com/article/ 
20130627/DEFREG01/306270013/Arctic-Nations-Set-Cooperation-Guidelines. 
26 RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153, CHANGES IN THE 
ARCTIC: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 51 (2013). 
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2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 
overarching strategic national security objective is a 
stable and secure region where U.S. national 
interests are safeguarded and the U.S. homeland is 
protected. This objective is consistent with a regional 
policy that reflects the relatively low level of threat in 
a region bounded by nations states that have not only 
publicly committed to working within a common 
framework of international law and diplomatic 
engagement, but also demonstrated ability and 
commitment to doing so over the last fifty years.  
 
Each state needs to be assured of the ability to defend its 
core interests. This scenario does not have a strategic role for 
nuclear weapons. However, the Arctic is host to nuclear-weapon-
equipped submarines, flights of nuclear-weapon-equipped 
bombers and ballistic missile launch sites.
27
 This anomaly has no 
benefits; whereas an Arctic free of nuclear weapons strengthens 
international peace and security, and lessens risk of conflict 
escalation wherever it occurs in the world. Removing nuclear 
armaments from the Arctic could be a mechanism to reduce the 
total global count of nuclear weapons, build confidence and 
demonstrate the intent to comply with the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.
28
 Unless this elimination is done expeditiously, then 
every one of the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) could 
potentially decide to deploy their nuclear-weapon-equipped 
submarines to patrol in the Arctic Ocean.
29
  
II STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
The efforts of many to diminish the role of nuclear weapons 
in national security strategy and to eliminate nuclear weapons 
have focussed, in recent times, on examining the support for this 
                                                          
27 REGEHR, supra note 23. 
28 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, entered into 
force Mar. 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483 [hereinafter NPT]. 
29 See generally REGEHR, supra note 23 (explaining the nuclear 
capabilities of various state actors in the Artic). 
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goal under International Humanitarian Law and Binding 
Customary Law.  
The key point of reference is the 1996 advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Included is the 
following: 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally 
be contrary to the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the 
principles and rules of humanitarian law . . . a use of 
force that is proportionate under the law of self-
defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the 
requirements of the law.
30
 
The use of nuclear weapons would not be considered 
proportionate because their destructive power cannot be 
contained in either time or space (due to extreme effects of blast, 
heat and radiation).
31
 Further the advisory opinion says: “There 
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a 
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its 
aspects under strict and effective international control.”32 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
undertook a major study in 2005, and concluded that nuclear 
weapons are illegal under universally binding customary law.
33
 
In 2010, the President of ICRC
34
 reaffirmed “the need for all 
States at all times to comply with applicable international law, 
including international humanitarian law.”35 Again there was 
reference to the destructive power of nuclear weapons being 
unable to be contained in either time or space.
36
 Here one can 
                                                          
30 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
31 Id. ¶ 35. 
32 Id. ¶ 105(2)(F). 
33 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Cross, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Volume 1: Rules 244 (2005).  
34 Jakob Kellenberger, President, ICRC, Statement Delivered to the 
Geneva Diplomatic Corps: Bringing the Era of Nuclear Weapons to an End 
(Apr. 20, 2010). 
35 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, U.S., May 3-28, 2010, Final 
Document, § I.(A.)(v.), NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I) (June 18, 2010). 
36 See Kellenberger, supra note 34. 
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also cite the Geneva Convention, Protocol 1, Article 35(3) which 
prohibits means of warfare that cause widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the environment.
37
  
The NPT Review Conference, held every five years, gathers 
delegates from the 189 signatory states, and in 2010 the 
Statement of Intent included, “the resurgence of international 
humanitarian law in the nuclear context presents an opportunity 
that must not be missed to demand that governments definitively 
rule out the use and possession of nuclear weapons.”38  
In 2011, eminent experts in international law and diplomacy 
gathered at a conference in Vancouver, Canada under the banner 
“Law’s Imperative for the Urgent Achievement of a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free World.” The Vancouver Declaration begins with 
“nuclear weapons are incompatible with elementary 
considerations of humanity.”39  
Negotiating an international, universal legal ban on nuclear 
weapons, supported by credible verification is known as a 
Nuclear Weapons Convention.
40
 This method of nuclear 
disarmament is now considered by most experts in the field to be 
the only viable means of arriving at the end goal; as step by step 
negotiations on separate issues have failed to advance the goal in 
any reasonable time frame.
41
 An equivalent to the Nuclear 
Weapons Convention is effectively achieved by a framework of 
mutually reinforcing agreements. This arrangement has been 
                                                          
37 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 
35, June 8, 1977, 1112 U.N.T.S. 1979. 
38 John Burroughs, Humanitarian Law or Nuclear Weapons: Chose One, 
NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM, http://www.abolitionforum.org/ 
site/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/IHL-or-nuclearweapons_choose-one.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
39 Vancouver Declaration, Law’s Imperative for the Urgent Achievement 
of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, (Feb. 11, 2011) http://lcnp.org/wcourt/ 
Feb2011VancouverConference/vancouverdeclaration.pdf. 
40 See generally Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference 
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
Working Paper Submitted by Costa Rica, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.17 
(proposing a model non-proliferation treaty). 
41 Cesar Jaramillo, There’s a New Sense of Urgency for a Nuclear 
Weapons Ban, PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES (May 17, 2013), http://ploughshares.ca/ 
2013/05/theres-a-new-sense-of-urgency-for-a-nuclear-weapons-ban/. 
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promoted by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 
Five Point Proposal on Nuclear Disarmament (2008).
42
  
An Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone creates a regional 
Nuclear Weapons Convention.  
III THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE (NWFZ) 
Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
numerous UN resolutions affirm the right of states to establish 
NWFZs in their territories. Encouragement to establish 
additional NWFZs is part of Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s 
Five Point Proposal.
43
  
In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly
44
 set forth 
principles for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones:  
 Non-possession 
 Non-deployment 
 Non-manufacture, including delivery 
systems 
 Non-use of nuclear weapons 
 The decision to create a NWFZ should be 
initiated within the region and arrived at 
freely by the states that make up the region 
 A NWFZ Treaty must be verifiable and of 
unlimited duration 
 Nuclear weapons states (NWS) must 
subsequently ratify protocols in their own 
legislatures, and offer negative security 
assurances to the region.  
Virtually all the southern hemisphere and parts of the 
northern hemisphere are already in NWFZs, each with individual 
                                                          
42 Ban Ki-Moon, Sec’y Gen., U.N., Address to the East-West Institute: 
The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear Weapon Free World (Oct. 24, 
2008), available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/ 
sg5point.shtml. 
43 Id. 
44 G.A. Res. 3472 (XXX), at 24, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3472(XXX) (Dec. 11, 
1975). 
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characteristics suited to the region.
45
 The history and status of 
each is seen in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 – Nuclear Weapon Free Zones46 
     
Name Treaty 
Date 
Ratification by 
Zonal States 
Protocols 
Ratified by 
NWS 
Ratification or 
consultations in 
progress with 
NWS 
Antarctica 1959 1961  All  
Tlatelolco 1967 1969 All  
Rarotonga 1985 1986  YES 
Bangkok 1995 1997  YES 
Pelindaba 1996 2009  YES 
Semipalatinsk 2006 2009  YES 
Mongolia 2000 2000 All  
 
Also, there are a few other areas that are officially 
demilitarized by treaty and are therefore free of nuclear weapons. 
For example, the Spitzbergen archipelago, including the island of 
Svalbard, part Norway, is demilitarized.
47
  
                                                          
45 Id. See also U.N. Off. Disarmament Aff. Guidelines and Principles for 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (Apr. 3. 1999), http://www.un.org/disarmament/ 
WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ2.shtml#text (stating “[n]uclear-weapon-free zones 
should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the 
States of the region concerned.”). 
46 See Jan Prawitz, Research Assoc. of the Swed. Inst. of Int’l Affairs, 
Presentation at the Conference on the Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: A 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Arctic –Arms Control ‘on the Rocks’ (Aug. 10-11, 
2009), in DIIS REPORT 2010:03 25, 25 (Cindy Vestergaard, ed. 2010), available  
at http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2010/RP2010-03_arctic_ 
nuclear_weapon_free_zone_web.pdf (reviewing all NWFZs including a 
potential Arctic NWFZ). 
47 See Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitzbergen, Feb. 9, 1920 
art. 9, 2 L.N.T.S. 8, 14. The Treaty was signed in 1920 and entered into force in 
1925. Lotta Numminen, A History and Functioning of the Spitsbergen Treaty, 
in THE SPITSBERGEN TREATY: MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ARCTIC 7, 8 
(Diana Wallis & Stuart Arnold eds. 2011), available at 
http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/en/document/spitsbergen-treaty- 
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On May 2, 2011, President Obama submitted the protocols 
of the treaties of Pelindaba, and Rarotonga, to the United States 
Senate for ratification.
48
 John Bravaco, U.S. Representative, 
United Nations Disarmament Commission, stated to the 2012 
Session (April 4) “Mr. Chairman, Over the past several years, 
the United States has reinvigorated its efforts to support nuclear-
weapon-free zone treaties as an important part of the multilateral 
arms control and non-proliferation architecture.”49  
IV ARCTIC GOVERNANCE 
International and intra-national collaboration is ongoing on 
many fronts. This includes regulations in support of economic 
development, environmental protection, settlement of Inuit and 
Aboriginal land claims, devolution of powers of governance (in 
Canada), science research, and the Arctic Council. Agreements 
and treaties that are regional, national, pan-Arctic, bilateral, 
multilateral and international exist
50
 and are being formed.
51
 
Arguably the most important is the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under international law, 
                                                                                                                   
booklet.pdf . Today, the treaty has some 40 parties. Id. at 9 & n.5. See generally 
G. ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY: FROM TERRA NULLIS TO NORWEGIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, 1995 (providing legal analysis of Spitzbergen Treaty). 
48 Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova & Miles Pomper, Obama Seeks Senate OK 
for Protocol to Two Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties, JAMES MARTIN 
CENT. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD. (May 6, 2011), http://cns.miis.edu/stories/ 
110506_obama_nwfz.htm. 
49 John A. Bravaco, U.S. Representative, U.N. Disarmament Comm’n, 
Statement by Mr. John A. Bravaco, U.S. Representative, United Nations 
Disarmament Commission 2012 Session (Apr. 4, 2012), available at 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/187495.htm.  
50 See BARENTS EURO-ARCTIC COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE 20TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE BARENTS EURO-ARCTIC COOPERATION 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Barents_Summit_ 
Declaration_2013.pdf (“On 11 January 1993, ministers of foreign affairs or 
other representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian 
Federation, Sweden and the Commission of the European Communities signed 
a declaration on cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic region . . . .”). 
51 See, e.g., ARCTIC COUNCIL, SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS’ REPORT TO 
MINISTERS 32-33, 39 (2013), available at http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-
from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting. 
2013] An Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 179 
 
sovereignty claims and rights on continental shelves will be 
resolved, as summarized in Table 2.
52
 All circumpolar states are 
signatories,
53
 but the United States has not yet ratified; UNCLOS 
is presently listed amongst “Treaties Pending” in the Senate.54  
 
TABLE 2 - Sovereign Rights under UNCLOS  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
RIGHT  DEFINITION  
Territorial sea  Not exceeding 12 nautical miles 
from the baseline; complete 
sovereignty, including resources  
Contiguous zone  Not extending beyond 24 nautical 
miles from the baseline; regulatory 
rights relating to infringement in 
the territorial sea  
                                                          
52 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982 arts. 
2, 33, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 400, 409, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
53 DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. OFF. OF THE LEGAL AFF., STATUS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OF THE AGREEMENT RELATING 
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION PART XI OF THE CONVENTION AND OF THE AGREEMENT 
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION RELATING TO 
THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY 
MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS: TABLE RECAPITULATING THE STATUS OF THE 
CONVENTION AND OF THE RELATED AGREEMENTS, AS AT 18 SEPTEMBER 2013, 
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf.  
54 Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov 
/s/l/treaty/pending/ (last updated Apr. 23, 2013). 
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Exclusive economic zone 
[EEZ]  
Not extending beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baseline; coastal 
State has sovereign rights for 
natural resources, living or non-
living, as well as sea-bed and 
subsoil. Jurisdiction on structures, 
artificial islands, marine research, 
protection of marine environment. 
Right to regulate for prevention of 
marine pollution, & vessel source 
pollution  
Continental shelf and its 
delineation  
Natural prolongation of the 
landmass of the coastal state to the 
outer edge of the continental 
margin up to 200 nautical miles, or 
if it is less, coincides with the EEZ. 
The limit is 350 nautical miles, or 
100 nautical miles from the 2500 
metre isobath  
Delineation of the 
continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles  
Supporting scientific and technical 
data is submitted to the 
Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, which shall 
make recommendations to the 
coastal States  
Exploration of the 
continental shelf; 
exploitation of its natural 
resources  
Only with express consent of the 
coastal State  
 
Some states have already acquired seafloor data, e.g. 
Russia,
55
 and others are still in the process.
56
 The UN 
                                                          
55 Malte Humpert, Russia Expected to Submit Arctic Claims to United 
Nations Within Months, ARCTIC INST. (Aug. 16, 2011, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2011/08/russia-expected-to-submit-arctic-
claim.html. 
56 Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Meeting the Deadline: Canada’s Arctic 
Submission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 
368, 369, 371-75 (2011). 
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Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) will 
assess the claims and issue a ruling, but that could take up to a 
decade.
57
 The CLCS has a backlog and growing workload, so 
additional resources are under consideration. Developments 
fostered under the Arctic Council are evidence of the intent to 
cooperate.  
 Ilulissat Declaration, 2008– five coastal nations 
agreed to responsible management of the Arctic 
Ocean and to respect UNCLOS to resolve 
maritime boundary disputes (This group 
included the United States, even though it had 
not ratified UNCLOS).
58
 
 Search & Rescue Agreement, 2011 – eight 
circumpolar countries: Arctic has defined search 
& rescue areas, coordinated multilateral 
management, retaining legal responsibility of 
each nation for its own territory.
59
 
 
 Oil spill response, preparedness, and, in 
preparation- oil spill prevention.
60
 
 
However, the mandate of the Arctic Council does not 
include military security, and so it is unable to champion the start 
of negotiations for an Arctic NWFZ.
61
 
Throughout the short and medium term future, new means of 
governance will be developed. If the Arctic NWFZ is accepted 
now as an essential goal, the accommodations achieved during 
negotiation of a treaty will be a global example of innovations in 
governance.  
                                                          
57 Id. at 375-77. 
58 See generally Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, May 12, 2011, 13 T.I.A.S. No. 13-
119 [hereinafter Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement]. 
59 See general id.  
60  See Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution, supra note 10, 
61 See Ottawa Declaration supra note 22, at 1388 n.1 (stating that “the 
Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security”).  
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V THE PATH TO AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE 
ZONE 
Because of regional differences, each nuclear-weapon-
free zone is unique within the terms of its treaty, but all adhere to 
the United Nations principles for NWFZs.
62
 There are several 
important factors affecting the proposed Arctic NWFZ. This 
would be the first NWFZ that encompasses only partial territory 
of sovereign nations.
63
 The obvious challenge is that the region 
contains two nuclear weapons states – United States and the 
Russian Federation. Five states – United States, Canada, 
Denmark, Iceland and Norway – are in NATO, a military 
alliance that undertakes to provide a nuclear “umbrella.”64 
Finland, Sweden, and Russia are not NATO members.
65
 The 
Arctic security policies of the non-nuclear weapon states 
(NNWS) have not properly addressed the presence of nuclear 
weapons in the region, although Denmark has made an 
enlightened move forward in its foreign policy statement of 2012 
                                                          
62 Second Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 
Apr. 30, 2010, Declaration and recommendations for the Second Conference of 
States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zones and Mongolia (30 April 2010), and the 2010 Review Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by 
the Civil Society Forum for Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, held at United 
Nations, New York, on 29 April 2010, U.N. Doc. NWFZM/CONF.2010/1, 
Annex 1 (May 5, 2010). 
63 Prawitz, supra note 46 (describing all NWFZs, each composed of a 
group of nation-states). 
64 See What is NATO? NATO.INT, http://www.nato.int/nato-
welcome/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). The Acronym NATO stands 
for North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For information about NATO’s 
members and purposes see id. 
65 See id. 
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which says it will pursue formation of an Arctic NWFZ.
66
 This 
section examines these issues and the influence they have on 
steps leading to removal of nuclear weapons from the Arctic 
region.   
At the height of the Cold War, Both Russia and the United 
States had numerous patrols of the Arctic Ocean by submarines 
equipped with nuclear-tipped missiles.
67
 However, these patrols 
have greatly declined, and appear to have little strategic 
importance beyond maintaining a sort of continuity. The U.S. 
Naval Intelligence says that the entire Russian fleet of nine 
ballistic missile submarines sailed on only five deterrent patrols 
in 2012.
68
 However, two new nuclear-powered SSBN Borei class 
Russian submarines, are being built in 2013, and Borei class 
“Yuri Dolgoruky” was launched in January 2013.69 The Yasen 
class nuclear-powered attack submarine, also under construction, 
is capable of being equipped with several missile types, not all 
with nuclear weapons.
70
 Generally these expensive new 
submarines have encountered technical problems, and have not 
                                                          
66 United Nations, Thematic Debate on Other Disarmament Measures, 
Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Statement by Den. Ambassador, U.N. 
GAOR, 67th Sess., 7th mtg. at 12-13, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/67/PV.7 (Oct. 15, 
2012), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/547/ 
28/PDF/N1254728.pdf. (“In conclusion, Denmark supports the voluntary 
establishment of regional zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction. We believe that we should explore how the establishment of 
such zones, including in the Arctic, could become an integral part of a 
comprehensive multilateral strategy to implement global nuclear disarmament 
and combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”). Likewise, a 2011 foreign 
policy statement provided by the Danish government states that “[i]n dialogue 
with Denmark's partners, the government will pursue the policy of making the 
Arctic region a nuclear weapon-free zone.” A Denmark That Stands Together, 
STM.DK, http://stm.dk/multimedia/Regeringsgrundlag_uk_2011.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
67 GRIFFITHS ET AL, supra note 24, at 51. 
68 Thomas Nilsen, Nuke Missile Subs Mostly at Port, BARENTS OBSERVER 
(May 6, 2013), http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/05/nuke-missile-
subs-mostly-port-06-05 (discussing Hans M. Kristiansen’s report). 
69 Charles Digges, Launch of new Russia sub to put more nuclear missiles 
at sea, BELLONA (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2012/ 
launch_borey. 
70 Charles Digges, Skyrocketing costs of launching ‘new’ nuclear 
submarine flex muscles Russia does not have, BELLONA (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2012/severdvinsk_delay. 
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met their original schedules.
71
 Some were intended for operation 
with the Pacific fleet, but facilities are not yet available, so they 
remain at Arctic ports.
72
 On the United States side of the 
submarine capabilities for the Arctic, the Virginia Class 
submarine, a SSBN type, continues to be ready, refurbished as 
required, and used in the Arctic.
73
 The U.S. submarines are based 
on both the West and East coasts of the country.
74
   
The United States has deployed its developing ballistic 
missile system at Fort Greely in Alaska (geographically below 
the Arctic Circle, 60 degrees latitude), but there continues to be 
many doubts whether it actually will ever be a viable military 
tool.
75
 Both Russia and the U.S. have nuclear bombers, and 
training missions of Russian aircraft regularly run in 
international air space near the Arctic.
76
 Are these operations 
Cold War relics, or is there a true strategic purpose involved? As 
expressed by Ernie Regehr in May 2013, “the real point is that 
Russian aircraft are no longer enemy aircraft.”77  
There is room for change in the current positions of these 
two nuclear weapon states, because of today’s reduced Arctic 
patrols of nuclear-armed delivery systems in the sea and in the 
air. Also relevant is that the United States, Russia, and also 
China are known to be putting emphasis on operations in the 
North Pacific and are increasing naval resources there.
78
 
                                                          
71 Id. 
72 Digges, supra note 69. 
73 REGEHR, supra note 23, at 29. 
74 Id. at 18 n.103. 
75 See History of Fort Greely, Greely.Army.Mil, 
http://www.greely.army.mil/about/history.aspx (last accessed Oct. 29, 2013); 
Elliot Blair Smith & Gopal Ratnam, $35B Missile Defense Misses Bullet With 
Bullet, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-08-03/missile-defense-costing-35-billion-misses-bullets-with-
bullets.html. 
76 See ERNIE REGEHR, FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY 2-5 
(2013), available at http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/all/files/ 
Fighter%20aircraft%20and%20Arctic%20sovereignty%20%20DAS%2C%20
May%2014%202013.pdf. 
77 Id. at 5. 
78 Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Def., Address at the U.S. Naval Acad. (May 29, 
2012), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1679 (stating 
“[t]hat reality is inescapable for our country and for our military, which has 
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Circumpolar nations repeatedly state their intent to cooperate and 
oppose militarization
79
. The presence of nuclear weapons is 
totally at odds with these policies. A recent report for Congress, 
“Changes in the Arctic: Background the Issues for Congress,”80 
makes several relevant observations, quoting from DOD: 
 
 *May 2011- DOD report to U.S. Congress: “a 
regional {Arctic} policy that reflects the relatively 
low level of threat in a region bounded by nation 
states that have . . . . publicly committed to 
working within a common framework of 
international law and diplomatic engagement.”81 
 
 [quoting from DOD Quadrennial Review, 2010] 
“we will seek out opportunities to work with 
Moscow on emerging issues, such as the future of 
the Arctic.”82  
 
 *Russian Foreign Minister 2010: “any 
militarization [of the Arctic] is out of the 
question.”83 
 
NATO is not formally in the Arctic, and even the well-
known Cold Response, the name for multilateral naval games in 
the Arctic, billed as a crisis response exercise, is not under the 
auspices of NATO, but is sponsored by the government of 
Norway. However, it has participation of all circumpolar 
members of NATO.
84
 A number of NATO members have 
                                                                                                                   
already begun broadening and deepening our engagement throughout the Asia-
Pacific.”). 
79 O’Dwyer, supra note 25. 
80 O’ROURKE, supra note 26, at 56, 59-60. 
81 Id. at 60.  
82 Id. at 59. 
83 Id. at 56. 
84 See generally Mikhail Aristov, NATO holds naval games in the Arctic, 
THE VOICE OF RUSSIA (Mar. 12, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://voiceofrussia.com/ 
2012_03_12/68216782/ (explaining that all the circumpolar members of NATO 
are participating in naval games). 
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interests in the Arctic and therefore, NATO has considered 
expanding its role to include Arctic territory.
85
 Canada continues 
to oppose any NATO presence in the Arctic, and Russia 
considers its core interests to be threatened by the presence of 
NATO.
86
 In 2010 and 2013, NATO Secretary-General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen assured Russia that it does not intend to 
establish in the Arctic.
87
 Membership in NATO is not in itself a 
hindrance to being part of a NWFZ. Australia, for example, is 
part of a nuclear alliance and also is a member of the Rarotonga 
NWFZ.
88
 The specifics of special accommodations under this 
treaty are given in a comprehensive analysis of “Political 
Aspects of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic Region” 
by Jayantha Dhanapala, a former UN Under-Secretary-General 
for Disarmament Affairs.
89
 While it would be highly preferable 
                                                          
85 See generally NATO Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and 
Security Co-Operation, Visit to Denmark, Greenland and Iceland, 201 
D.S.C.T.C. 10 E (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp? 
SHORTCUT=2209 (detailing the reasoning behind NATO’s consideration to 
expand to the Arctic). 
86 See generally Andrew Chisholm, NATO in the North? The Debate 
Over an Alliance Presence in the Arctic, ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF CAN. (Jun. 3, 
2013), http://atlantic-council.ca/portfolio/nato-in-the-north-the-debate-over-an-
alliance-presence-in-the-arctic/ (describing the nature and extent of NATO 
military presence in the Arctic); See generally Igor Alexeev, Russia’s Arctic, 
NATO And Norway: A Post-Kirkenes Political Landscape--Analysis, EURASIA 
REV. (Jun. 20, 2013), http://www.eurasiareview.com/20062013-russias-arctic-
nato-and-norway-a-post-kirkenes-political-landscape-analysis/ (explaining that 
Russia feels its interests are threatened by NATO presence in the Arctic).  
87 Id. See also Chisholm, supra note 86. 
88 Austl. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia - US alliance, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/australia_us_alliance.html. See also 
Mukhatzhanova & Pomper, supra note 48; Table 1. 
89 Jayantha Dhanapala VIth Russian Congress of Political Science in 
Moscow from 22-24 November, 2012; session on "International Co-operation 
in the Arctic region: Security and Development.” An excerpt from the text -
1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, Article 5 (2) of that says –  
 
Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to 
decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft 
to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, 
and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, 
archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.” It was 
this provision that enables Australia to allow US nuclear weapon 
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for NATO to adjust its nuclear doctrine to accommodate its non-
nuclear-weapon-state (NNWS) circumpolar members that wish 
to be in an Arctic NWFZ, there is nothing in the NATO charter 
or agreements that precludes any country from taking such a step 
unilaterally.
90
 It may be useful to form a cooperative security 
organization of all Arctic states [i.e. the Arctic Council 
members], as proposed in January 2012 at the Arctic Coast 
Guard Forum.
91
 This would be a confidence building measure 
that has potential to be favourable to formation of an Arctic 
NWFZ.  
The Arctic NNWS have already fulfilled important criteria 
for inclusion in a NWFZ, so that they could, as a group, enter 
negotiations for a NWFZ treaty.
92
 Denmark
93
 is the only 
                                                                                                                   
armed ships to call at its ports.  
 
Of note – New Zealand, in exercise of its sovereign rights, declined any 
access to such foreign vessels or aircraft.  
90 Ted Whiteside, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public 
Diplomacy, Remarks at the Nuclear Security meeting at Dubrovnik, Croatia 
sponsored by the World Academy of Arts & Science, European Security 
Network and NATO (Nov. 14-17, 2012). 
91 See generally HEATHER A. CONLEY, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUDIES, A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR THE ARCTIC: AN AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVE (2012) (describing Arctic Coast Guard Forum). 
92 Prawitz, supra note 46, at 36-37 (describing the requirements for 
NWFZ and how they are met by arctic NNWS). 
93 See generally DENMARK, GREENLAND & THE FAROE ISLANDS: 
KINGDOM OF DENMARK: STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC 2011-2020 (2011), 
available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source= 
web&cd=1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fenter
prise%2Fpolicies%2Fraw-materials%2Ffiles%2Fdocs%2Fmss-
denmark_en.pdf&ei=ZTV0UtfIN6eqyAHn5oBA&usg=AFQjCNEF_9MlhVfH
3TA1jTgQyH37T313Xw&sig2=2g_PB_25GBgYOAI9ynFayA&bvm=bv.5581
9444,d.aWc&cad=rja. D (explaining Denmark’s policies for the Arctic region.) 
Denmark’s Social Democrat government, elected in 2011, indicated it would 
engage in consultations with other circumpolar nations on the topic, and the 
intent of establishing an Arctic NWFZ . See PRIME MINISTER OF DENMARK, A 
DENMARK THAT STANDS TOGETHER (describing Danish policy that the Arctic 
should be a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the “International Peace and Security” 
section), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc= 
s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fstm.dk%2F
multimedia%2FRegeringsgrundlag_uk_2011.pdf&ei=izZ0Uqv6CaOEygHO1A
E&usg=AFQjCNGRS3--
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circumpolar state to include Arctic NWFZ in its foreign policy 
statement for the region. A DENMARK THAT STANDS 
TOGETHER noted that “the need for a united multilateral 
strategy to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons . . . in 
dialogue with Denmark‘s partners, the Government will pursue 
the proposal of making the Arctic region a nuclear weapon-free 
zone.”94 The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 
(NPDI), a Ministerial group that includes Canada, a circumpolar 
nation, supports NWFZs.
95
 In 2011, it stated that “[w]e firmly 
support . . . the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones . . . 
taking into consideration that such zones are not an end in 
themselves but rather a means to reinforce the global non-
proliferation regime and contribute to nuclear disarmament.”96  
In the 1980s, the indigenous populations of the Arctic 
already saw the deleterious effects of nuclear material in the 
North, and in 1983, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference issued 
their Resolution on a Nuclear Free Zone in the Arctic. The 
Resolution is still in force;
97
 it would be valuable to have this 
document revised and re-issued. 
Security developments in the Arctic are of great importance 
to the Icelandic Government. As described in a speech to a 
symposium at Ottawa University in October 2012 by the 
Ambassador of Iceland to Canada, H. E. Thordur Oskarrson, the 
Foreign Affairs Department of the newly elected Government of 
Iceland issued a Manifesto (May 2009) indicating intent to 
cooperate with other Arctic nations, saying “Work will continue 
on formulating a security policy for Iceland based on the 
country's own risk assessment in close co-operation with 
                                                                                                                   
ahHYFwJ697jlIfkQvVsU_g&sig2=KdmdOpvKdUah8gDpsEA9-
g&bvm=bv.55819444,d.aWc&cad=rja (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). 
94 Id. See also Digges, supra note 70. 
95 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, The Hague Statement 
(Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/documenten-
en-publicaties/convenanten/2013/04/09/non-proliferation-and-disarmament-
initiative.html. 
96 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Statement of the Third 
Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Sept. 
21, 2011), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/ 
npdi_mstate110921.pdf. 
97 Interview with Mary Simon, founding President , Inuit Circumpolar 
Council, in Ottawa, Ont., Can. (Sept. 22, 2011) (on file with author). 
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neighbouring nations and other allied states.”98 In reference to 
nuclear weapons, the Manifesto says “Iceland will be declared a 
nuclear weapons free zone and the Icelandic government will 
support nuclear disarmament internationally.”99 A draft law on a 
nuclear free Iceland was submitted to its parliament, the 
Althingi, and the status as of 2012 is that it was sent to the 
government for modification and further decision.
100
  
 
VI  GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES AND THE PATH TO AN 
ARCTIC NWFZ 
 
It is often assumed that the boundary of choice is the Arctic 
Circle, at Latitude 60 deg. N. Such a nominal boundary is of 
particular interest because it would be the first NWFZ that 
included only partial territories of its nation-state signatories.
101
 
Another potential boundary is that defined by the Search and 
Rescue Agreement of 2011 (several areas are south of the Arctic 
Circle).
102
 An advantage of this boundary is that this territory is 
already defined in detail.
103
 Efficiencies would accrue because 
there would be no need to define new boundaries for treaty 
purposes, and the international community will become 
accustomed to these boundaries as they respond to search and 
                                                          
98 Thordur Oskarrsson, Ambassador to Can., Embassy of Ice., Address at 
the Ottawa University Symposium: Policy Imperatives for an Arctic Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone (Oct. 26-27, 2012), in CANADIAN PUGWASH, POLICY 
IMPERATIVES FOR AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE 14, 18 (2013), 
available at http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/images/documents/2013/POLICY 
%20IMPERATIVES%20for%20an%20ARCTIC%20NWFZ%20May%206%2
02013.pdf. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. In a paper submitted to the Polar Journal, a further reference is 
provided by H. Haftendorn, FU Berlin, as follows: Frumvarptil laga um 
friðlýsingu Íslands fyrir kjarnorkuvopnum og bann við umferð 
kjarnorkuknúinna farar-tækja, 139. löggfarþing 2010-2011, þskj. 18 – 18. mǻl, 
www.althingi.is/altext/139/s/pdf/0018.pdf. 
101 Bravaco, supra note 49. Each Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 
covers the entire nation-state in the participating region. Id. 
102 See generally Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, supra note 58, 
Annex, T.I.A.S. No. 13-0119 (providing the exact definition of the Search and 
Rescue regions and boundaries). 
103 Id. 
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rescue operations. Within either territory, the United States has 
no stationed nuclear weapons or missiles, whereas Russia’s 
submarine bases are stationed on the Kola Peninsula and along 
the coasts of the Barents and White Seas.
104
 There have been 
discussions around a nuclear-weapon-free Arctic, or portions of 
the Arctic, for some years, e.g. for a Nordic NWFZ. At this time 
in history the most likely successful path is through the 
circumpolar NNWS. Discussions could commence, possibly 
initiated by Denmark, and a consensus could be reached to 
satisfy the geography and politics of the participating states. 
When a consensus is obtained, as postulated above, the 
circumpolar NNWS would act together to sign and ratify a treaty 
involving their own territories, and encompassing one or more 
of: 
 Land area delineated by the Agreement on 
Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue in the Arctic
105
 
 
 Surface and under-sea territorial waters, and the 
contiguous zone, per UNCLOS, as well as any 
limitations available for each country’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone
106
 
 
 Air space 
 
 To accommodate submarines equipped with 
nuclear weapons, the UNCLOS “rights of 
innocent passage” would apply for submarines, as 
required
107
  
 
To accommodate the hoped-for entry of the NWS, the treaty 
could be open for later entry by other states, as was the case for 
                                                          
104 GRIFFITHS, supra note 24, at 34. 
105 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic supra note 58, at 8. 
106 Bravaco, supra note 49; see also Table 2. 
107 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 52, arts. 
17-19, at 404-05.  
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the Tlatelolco Treaty. When the NNWS have agreed on their 
limited geography NWFZ treaty, they would be able to continue 
their efforts within the United Nations First Committee, which 
meets annually for several weeks.
108
 In a situation where 
significant support had been received from participants in the 
First Committee, the following step would probably be to 
introduce a resolution to the General Assembly, backed by the 
NNWS and others, for an Arctic NWFZ. This is the path that has 
strong potential to produce a positive result.  
When the NNWS are united in their intent to pursue a treaty, 
they should approach the United States and Russia. A strong 
verification system will be required; during this period, there 
should be parallel work on verification.
109
 The U.S. and Russia 
would experience regional and global pressure, and the response 
could start with a limited disengagement. For example, they 
could begin with elimination of patrolling by SSBN submarines 
in the Arctic. A unilateral move in partial compliance, in 
anticipation of a potential response from the other NWS, would 
greatly advance the cause.  
It might seem overly optimistic to anticipate that these NWS 
would later join the Arctic NWFZ. However, concurrent 
developments in global strategy for security might lower the 
barrier to Arctic NWFZ, as follows: 
 
 Budgetary limitations on military expenditure110 
                                                          
108 Disarmament and International Security, First Committee, U.N. GEN. 
ASSEMBLY, http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 
2013), (“The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and 
threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions 
to the challenges in the international security regime”). See Documents of the 
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 Challenges in the Asia-Pacific area, which would 
see a strong presence of nuclear-weapon 
submarines from U.S.,
111
 Russia, China, and 
possibly India.
112
 As a result, availability of 
submarines for patrol in the Arctic would 
decrease.  
 
 Ongoing negotiations for reduction of stockpiles 
of NW, beyond the commitments of the New 
Start Treaty: President Obama, in his 2013 State 
of the Union Address said “we will engage 
Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear 
arsenals . . . because our ability to influence 
others depends on our willingness to lead.” This 
is not just rhetoric, but is a necessity to lay the 
foundation for progress with an existing major 
policy, which is to prevent nuclear proliferation.  
 
 Environmental risk of an accident resulting in 
high-level radioactive waste: (However, an Arctic 
NWFZ would not cause removal of nuclear-
powered submarines.) A cleanup plan is needed 
for nuclear waste in the sea and on land, 
particularly in Russia, in the Kara Sea.
113
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http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-andreasen-nuclear-
bomb-20130606,0,4306971.story; see Kingston Reif, It’s smart to scale back 
nuclear weapons spending, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May 21, 2013), 
http://thebulletin.org/its-smart-scale-back-nuclear-weapons-spending. 
111 See generally Pentagon, US should enhance Asia-Pacific military 
role, RT.COM (May 30, 2012), http://rt.com/news/us-military-pacific-panetta-
570/ (reporting on a speech by Defense Secretary Panetta at the U.S. Naval 
Academy). 
112 See generally Rick Rozoff, US Threatens China: The Pentagon 
Prepares Confrontation in Asia-Pacific, THE 4TH MEDIA (Jun. 4, 2012), 
http://www.4thmedia.org/2012/06/04/america-threatens-china-pentagon-
prepares-for-confrontation-in-the-asia-pacific/ (explaining the threat felt by 
Asia-Pacific nations after a speech by Defense Secretary Panetta on U.S. 
military movements in the region). 
113 Jayantha Dhanapala, President, Conferences on Science and World 
Affairs, Moderator at the VI Russian Congress of Political Science: Russia in 
2013] An Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 193 
 
 World opinion favors abolition of nuclear 
weapons.
114
 
VII. PROPOSAL FOR AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-
FREE ZONE 
To date, the proposal for an Arctic NWFZ has received 
interest and support in U.N. circles and through papers and 
conferences sponsored by NGOs,
115
 but there is little or no 
attention to it in official policies of the circumpolar nations. The 
eighteen recommendations from the report “Policy Imperatives 
for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,”116 are pragmatic 
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ways to move forward with the proposed NWFZ. For example, a 
draft framework of an Arctic NWFZ Treaty would be useful. 
Engaging parliamentarians, nationally and at an international 
level is important, and the recommendations suggest contact 
with the World Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.   
On balance, the most promising tactic is for a coalition of all 
the Arctic NNWS to form a nuclear-weapon-free zone. 
Therefore, the way to begin is to use all available avenues to 
influence the Arctic foreign policy of each individual state so 
that the commitment to negotiate is active in each of the states in 
the region. Establishing an Arctic region free of nuclear 
weapons, will be a long process. However, signing a treaty for a 
formal Zone could be a tipping point that could lead to a nuclear-
weapon-free world. The future of the Arctic is being set in place 
now; the policy window is open.  
 
 
